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Abstract: Developments in Canada’s constitutional and legal framework since 1982 
set the stage for the current Liberal government’s nation-to-nation policy, which rec­
ognizes Indigenous rights and seeks to build a relationship of respect and partnership 
through reconciliation with Indigenous peoples. These developments have important 
implications for those engaged in policy and program evaluations who are now called 
upon—not only by their own professional ethics but by the legal principles fl owing 
from Section 35—to reimagine their approach and work as partners with Indigenous 
nations based on the recognition of Indigenous rights, reconciliation, and the Crown’s 
duty to act honourably in all of its dealings with Indigenous peoples. There are no 
off-the-shelf answers for how this can be done. Evaluation professionals will need to 
be guided by these key legal principles and the progressive view set out in the Liberal 
government’s Principles respecting the Government of Canada’s Relationship with 
Indigenous Peoples . 
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Résumé : L’évolution du cadre juridique et constitutionnel canadien depuis 1982 a 
ouvert la voie aux politiques de l’actuel gouvernement libéral pour les relations de 
nation à nation, qui reconnaissent les droits autochtones et visent à établir une rela­
tion fondée sur le respect et le partenariat, par l’intermédiaire de la réconciliation 
avec les peuples autochtones. Cette évolution a des conséquences importantes pour 
les personnes qui font de l’évaluation de programmes et de politiques et qui doivent 
maintenant — non seulement par éthique professionnelle, mais aussi pour des rai­
sons juridiques découlant de l’article 35 — revoir leur approche et travailler comme 
partenaires des nations autochtones, en tenant compte des droits des Autochtones, 
de la réconciliation et du devoir de la Couronne d’agir de façon honorable dans 
toutes ses interactions avec des personnes autochtones. Cependant, il n'existe pas 
de procédure claire décrivant comment cela doit s'accomplir. Les professionnels et 
professionnelles de l’évaluation devront se laisser guider par ces principes juridiques 
clés et l’approche progressive décrite dans le document  Principes régissant la relation 
du Gouvernement du Canada avec les peuples autochtones du gouvernement libéral. 
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Canada’s Indigenous peoples are distinct peoples. They were here first, and they 
lived in communities/nations that governed their own people, their lands, and 
their resources according to their own cultural norms and legal traditions. Th e 
colonial objective was to take that power away, and, in practical terms and over 
time, it succeeded. But the 1982 introduction of Section 35 in Canada’s Consti­
tution acknowledged that underlying Indigenous rights were not extinguished. 
Over the intervening 40 years, the Courts have filled a policy vacuum by giving 
meaning to Indigenous rights and constructing the essential scaff olding upon 
which the Crown’s relationship with Canada’s Indigenous people rests. Th e cur­
rent Liberal government’s nation-to-nation policy position is built on that and 
is informed by  The Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (RCAP, 1996), the 
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UN Offi  ce of the 
High Commissioner for Human Rights [UNOHCHR], 2013), and the  Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission Report (TRC, 2016). It represents a transformational 
shift from policy “denial” to clear “recognition” of Indigenous rights, including the 
right to self-determination, and a focus on building a relationship of respect and 
partnership through ongoing reconciliation. This is a significant transition that 
has important implications for those engaged in policy and program evaluations. 
FROM SHARED POWER TO CROWN CONTROL 
AND BACK TO SHARED POWER: FROM TREATIES 
TO S. 91(24) TO THE PROMISE OF S.35 
By the time Canada’s Constitution came into force in 1867, the Crown - Indigenous 
relationship had already evolved from one of recognition and “peace and friend­
ship” to one marked by efforts to transfer Indigenous rights and power to the 
Crown through land cession and other means targeted at undermining Indig­
enous cultures and societies. The journey from the  Royal Proclamation, 1763 
(which recognized that Indigenous peoples had occupied land prior to European 
contact and committed to achieving the cession of that land through treaties) to 
the pre-Confederation treaties, including the Peace and Friendship treaties signed 
in the Atlantic colonies, the Robinson-Huron treaties, and early land cession 
treaties in what is now Ontario, showed that colonialist interests had shift ed. In 
the early years, alliances with Indigenous peoples were needed to ensure settler 
survival. As time passed and focus turned toward settler migration to the west, 
the primary objective was to ensure the availability of land. The treaties signed be­
tween 1871 and 1923 operated to reduce the land base held by Indigenous peoples. 
Control over “Indians” and their lands was seen as a matter related to Canada’s 
“nation building,” and, through Section 91(24), the federal government obtained 
jurisdiction over “Indians and lands reserved for Indians.” 
Initially, the jurisprudence took a very narrow view of Indigenous rights. Th e 
earliest interpretation of the  Royal Proclamation of 1763 was that Aboriginal title 
was a “personal and usufructory right,” which acted as a burden on the Crown’s 
underlying title. The source of Indigenous rights was the Crown’s sovereignty. In 
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other words, those rights existed at the Crown’s discretion ( St. Catharines Milling 
and Lumber Company v. Th e Queen , 1888 ). 
Under the authority of s. 91(24), the federal government enacted the  Indian 
Act, which created a “wardship” system, controlling the lives of Indigenous peo­
ples from cradle to grave. It created the land reserve system and related band 
system, dictating the features of governance and controlling all aspects of Indig­
enous societies, from membership to movement and beyond. While traditional 
Indigenous governments were not expressly abolished, those who continued to 
exercise their inherent right to self-government often did so covertly (Centre for 
First Nations  Governance, 2011). There was a prohibition against pursuing land 
claims, and Indigenous social and spiritual practices were outlawed until the 1950 
(Centre for First Nations  Governance, 2011). Residential Schools, which operated 
from the 1800s through to the mid-1990s, were created with the express purpose 
of taking the Indian out of the child.
 The Crown’s predisposition to interpreting claimed rights in line with its own 
interests and legal construct largely denied the Indigenous point of view. Cumu­
latively and over time, these attitudes and practices buttressed Crown control 
and manifested a colonialist view that led to the widespread marginalization of 
Indigenous peoples. 
But Indigenous peoples did not give up on their rights, cultures, and nations. 
Largely as a result of their unrelenting commitment and mobilization, we have 
observed a mix of significant policy and jurisprudential developments occur­
ring over the last half of the twentieth century and into the twenty-first that have 
dramatically changed how their place in the country is regarded by Canadians. 
A modern legal framework: Section 35 
By 1970, Indigenous peoples were energized by their effective opposition to the 
federal government’s 1969 White Paper (which called for the repeal of the  Indian 
Act and a strategy of assimilation) and by their success in establishing Indigenous 
title as a legal right to land, not having as its source Crown sovereignty but pre­
existing it1 (Calder v. British Columbia (Attorney General) , 1973 ). Indigenous 
leaders secured the inclusion of Section 35 in the 1982 amendments to the Con­
stitution, which was a critical turning point in Canadian history, although not 
obvious at the time. 
Section 35 (1) reads, “The existing Aboriginal and treaty rights of the Abo­
riginal peoples of Canada are hereby recognized and affi  rmed.”2 Th is wording 
is broad, and it was to be the work of Constitutional conferences to settle its 
meaning. Unfortunately, those conferences failed to close the deep and wide gap 
between the differing perspectives held by the Indigenous and non-Indigenous 
negotiators. Indigenous leaders regarded s. 35(1) as a “full box” of rights that 
would be used to redefine their place in Canada. Non-Indigenous leaders saw it 
as an “empty box,” more symbolism than substance, changing nothing. 
Indigenous peoples returned to the courts, and the courts responded in an 
iterative but highly significant way, creating a constitutional legal framework 
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based on s. 35 that has fundamentally redefined the Crown’s relationship with 
Indigenous peoples. It is a framework that will continue to evolve over time but, 
at its core, recognizes that Indigenous peoples have collective rights derived from 
their ancestors’ presence prior to the assertion of Crown sovereignty and that 
those rights include the inherent right to govern themselves in relation to those 
rights ( R. v. Van der Peet , 1996 ; Delgamuukw v. British Columbia , 1997 ; Tsilhqot’in 
Nation v. British Columbia, 2014 ). It recognizes that the inclusion of s. 35 in the 
Constitution represented “the culmination of a long and diffi  cult struggle in both 
the political forum and the courts for the constitutional recognition of Aboriginal 
rights ….” Also, it is guided by s. 35’s “call for a just settlement for Indigenous 
peoples, one that renounces the old rules of the game under which the Crown 
wielded absolute power to its own advantage”3 (R. v. Sparrow , 1990 ). 
Time and again, the Supreme Court has returned to the core objective of 
Section 35 both as a means of grounding the interpretation of Indigenous rights 
and as a means of guiding the conduct of both the Crown and Indigenous peoples 
within the special relationship they share under the Constitution. Th e “fundamen­
tal objective of the modern law of Aboriginal and treaty rights is the reconciliation 
of Aboriginal peoples and non-Aboriginal peoples and their respective claims, 
interests and ambitions.” It “provides the constitutional framework through which 
the fact that Aboriginal peoples lived on the land in distinctive societies, with their 
own practices, customs and traditions is acknowledged and reconciled with the 
sovereignty of the Crown” ( R. v.Van der Peet, 1996 ). 
 The court has advanced this core objective of reconciliation by adopting a 
progressive vision: it calls for a “purposive analysis” of Section 35(1) to be applied, 
having regard to a set of general principles that the Court has developed over time 
and used to characterize the legal relationship between the Crown and Indigenous 
peoples. The starting point is that the relationship is a fiduciary one. Th e Court 
has said that foundational finding demands that a generous and liberal interpreta­
tion be given in favour of Indigenous peoples, with any ambiguity as to the scope 
and definition of s. 35 being resolved in favour of them ( R. v. Van der Peet , 1996 ). 
In line with that, when Indigenous rights are assessed based on the tests the 
courts have developed4 (Delgamuuk v. British Columbia , 1997 ; R. v. Van der Peet, 
1996 ), they can be regarded as occupying a place along a spectrum of rights, from 
Aboriginal title at one end to rights that are not necessarily connected to the land. 
And they must be understood using an approach that is culturally inclusive. For 
example, in the case of Aboriginal title, the Court has said that occupation can 
be proved by physical presence and Aboriginal law and needs to be evaluated in 
accordance with the way of life of the people in question ( Delgamuukw v. British 
Columbia , 1997 ). The approach must take into account the dual perspectives of 
the Aboriginal group in question (i.e., its laws, practices, size, technological abil­
ity) and common-law notions such as, in the case of land and title, possession as 
a basis for recognition ( Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia, 2014 ). In support of 
this balanced approach to the analysis, the Courts have expanded the legal rules 
of evidence not only to accept the oral histories of Indigenous societies but also to 
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place them on an equal footing with other forms of evidence the courts are more 
accustomed to ( Delgamuukw v. British Columbia , 1997 ). The critical point is that 
in getting to recognition of a particular Aboriginal right, both sides’ views must 
be respected, as expressed through their own means. 
 The process of reconciliation begins with this act of recognition that rights ex­
ist and continues throughout the relationship. Inherent in the principle of recon­
ciliation is the notion that no rights are absolute.5 Thus, at its core, reconciliation 
demands a principled approach to balancing the rights and interests of Indigenous 
peoples with the broader Canadian community ( Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, 
1997 , p. 161). Grounded in the fi duciary nature of the relationship, a principled 
approach to reconciliation means that proposed limits on Indigenous rights must 
meet a “justification” test. The Crown must demonstrate that the action it pro­
poses to take is “in furtherance of a compelling and substantive objective” and 
that infringement of the Indigenous right is consistent with the special fi duciary 
relationship between the Crown and Indigenous peoples ( Delgamuukw v. British 
Columbia, 1997 , pp. 161–168). As part of that, the Crown must minimize the im­
pairment of the right and, importantly, consult with the Indigenous group to ob­
tain its perspective. Consistent with the fiduciary relationship, the Crown is held 
to the standard of acting honourably in this exercise—and in all of its dealings—in 
order to achieve the reconciliation of pre-existing Indigenous societies with the 
sovereignty of the Crown. 
 The court’s commitment to the purposes of s. 35 and this principled standard 
of conduct has been tested, particularly in the regulatory context, by governments 
that, still influenced by pre-Section 35 norms, have often taken a technocratic and 
minimalist rather than progressive or purposive approach to their dealings with 
Indigenous peoples. The courts have responded with increasingly clear direction. 
For example, in its 2004 decision in  Haida (Haida Nation v. British Colum­
bia (Minister of Forests), 2004 ) the Supreme Court articulated the principle of 
the honour of the Crown which has emerged as the primary standard for both 
guiding and assessing Crown conduct in managing its relationships with Indig­
enous peoples. The Court identified the honour of the Crown, otherwise put, the 
Crown’s responsibility to act honourably,  as the source of the duty to consult with 
Indigenous peoples and to accommodate those rights, where appropriate. Th e 
duty arises when the Crown contemplates taking action that may have an impact 
on claimed Indigenous rights. The practical parameters of the duty to consult 
and accommodate depends on the strength of the claim and potential impact of 
Crown actions on it.6
 This was a significant and foundational decision. It introduced the idea of 
general recognition of Indigenous rights, which do not have to be “proved” or 
established by a court in order to command acknowledgement and respect. And it 
gave heft to the Crown’s duty to act honourably in all its dealings with Indigenous 
peoples. That includes a duty to engage respectfully with Indigenous peoples and 
give full account to their perspectives. This has been the Court’s way of saying that 
it’s all about the relationship. 
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 The Court’s careful articulation of the principles of reconciliation, the fi duci­
ary relationship, the honour of the Crown, and the duty to consult has provided 
the Crown and Indigenous peoples with a range of tools to respectfully and con­
structively manage their relationships. Aligned with that, the Court has repeatedly 
encouraged principled processes of honourable negotiation over reliance on the 
courts to resolve differences. It is “only through negotiations with good faith and 
give and take on all sides, reinforced by the judgments of the court, that we will 
achieve what is said to be the basic purpose of section 35 (i.e., the reconciliation 
of the pre-existing Aboriginal societies with the sovereignty of the Crown). Let 
us face it. We are all here to stay” ( Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, 1997 , p. 181). 
THE GOVERNMENT POLICY AGENDA: NATION TO NATION
 The federal government’s nation-to-nation agenda, as expressed in the  Principles 
respecting the Government of Canada’s Relationship with Indigenous Peoples (Min­
ister of Justice, 2017) rests on this legal and constitutional framework. It advances 
an ambitious and progressive view that is founded on the promise of Section 35 
and informed by RCAP, the TRC, and UNDRIP.7 
Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, saying that the Crown - Indigenous relation­
ship reflects a sacred obligation founded on constitutionally protected Indigenous 
rights, has called for a renewed nation-to-nation relationship, “based on recog­
nition of rights, respect, co-operation, and partnership” (Trudeau, 2015). Th e 
Principles say that the promise of s. 35 and UNDRIP’s call to respect and promote 
the inherent rights of Indigenous peoples mean that all governments should “shift 
their relationships and arrangements with Indigenous peoples so that they are 
based on recognition and respect for their rights to self-determination, including 
the inherent right to self-government for Indigenous nations” 8 (Minister of Jus­
tice, 2017) (Principle 1). In other words, recognition of these rights is at the heart 
of reconciliation, and in order to give life to a new post-colonialist relationship we 
must build new structures and make decisions in new ways. We must move from 
control to collaboration (Webber, 2017). 
 The principle of reconciliation under Section 35, with its objective of restor­
ing mutually respectful relations between peoples and nations, is large enough to 
accommodate all of that. In fact, it demands it. And the Court reminds us that 
what it looks like in practice “must be devised by means that are more participa­
tory, cross-cultural, flexible and varied than are possible in proceeding before the 
courts” 9 (Webber, 2017). What we are looking for is institutional mechanisms that 
are accepted as legitimate by all constituent groups and are capable of working 
together10 (Webber, 2017). Both Indigenous nations and governments must work 
at this across the range of their many interactions. 
MAKING THE NATION-TO-NATION RELATIONSHIP A REALITY 
Progress toward turning the “nation-to-nation” vision into a reality remains slow 
and tentative because many of the key structural impediments, including biases, 
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have remained intact. Nonetheless, the steps the federal government has taken 
may be seen as progress toward establishing the conditions within which Indig­
enous peoples can resituate themselves by rebuilding their nations and reassum­
ing their role as full partners in the country’s constitutional order. A critical next 
step will involve Indigenous leaders and the federal government working together, 
on a nation-to-nation basis, to develop shared understandings of what Indig­
enous “self-government,” “nationhood,” and “co-existing sovereignties” mean. It is 
through this collaborative effort that the terms upon which—and the institutional 
arrangements through which—ongoing nation-to-nation relationships can be de­
veloped and maintained. Evaluation professionals should be both keen observers 
of and participants in these efforts, which will necessarily reshape and enrich both 
their work processes and the value of their contributions to making the nation-
to-nation relationship a reality. Along the way, Canada’s constitutional framework 
will continue to evolve as the courts are called upon to provide further guidance. 
For their part, Indigenous leaders will necessarily lead the work of nation 
building. Stephen Cornell, a specialist in political economy and cultural sociology 
and co-founder of the Harvard Project on American Indian Economic Develop­
ment, has spent decades working closely with Indigenous nations and organiza­
tions in the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, on governance, 
economic development, and tribal policy issues to help them do just that. Cornell 
(2008 ) encourages Indigenous leaders to dedicate themselves to rebuilding the 
fundamentals, that is, identifying their citizenry, developing independent govern­
ments and independent economic institutions, and securing territory and sources 
of revenue. He underscores the magnitude of the challenge that Indigenous lead­
ers face in this work, acknowledging that they will have to look aft er present 
social, economic, cultural, and other needs of their people (for example, housing, 
education, social services, water) while building toward a future in which their 
nation’s relationships with other orders of government are put on a fundamentally 
diff erent footing. 
 This is highly complex work that engages challenges on three broad fronts: 
political, fiscal, and administrative. For example, while the legal and constitu­
tional framework is in place, the political challenges Indigenous leaders face are 
both internal to the community (e.g., community readiness, will and resilience, 
confidence and trust) and external (securing willing and committed partners 
in other orders of government). Th e fiscal challenges include breaking out of 
structural obstacles in the existing model and finding sources of funding for 
rebuilding governance, while constructing new fiscal relationships with other 
orders of government. And the administrative challenges are equally fundamental 
and daunting. Indigenous leaders must realign their nation’s administration and 
help it develop the new tools needed to support and implement new models and 
political directions. 
Cornell (2018 ) argues that at the core of this nation rebuilding is the task of 
building good governance (i.e., how the community organizes itself to pursue its 
own objectives, through “sustained, effective, organized action today”). He de­
scribes three major elements that should be dealt with by communities as priorities. 
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First, the community should identify its core principles (i.e., the fundamental 
understandings of the community that come out of its own experience and culture 
that reflect what the community is about, what its purposes are, the basis of au­
thority in the community, and the appropriate organizational use of that author­
ity). And it should defi ne what the community is trying to protect, change, and 
achieve. It should then use those core principles to guide the building of practical, 
effective mechanisms and robust tools (such as written constitutions, designated 
offices, laws, and the mechanisms for enforcing those laws), agreements with 
other governments, and a range of other practical tools ,  including evaluation ,  that 
will form the machinery that gets things done on a daily basis. 
Second, the community must build a bureaucratic administration that is 
grounded in sound management practices and is capable of supporting political 
decision making, implementing government direction across a range of sectors, 
and, in line with its values, evaluating progress. 
 Third, the community must build new relationship mechanisms with other 
orders of government. With the assumption of jurisdiction in place, these will 
be the mechanisms through which Indigenous nations can negotiate the spheres 
within which they will operate, and related issues of subsidiarity, and the support 
they need to manage a broad range of social needs while sorting out critical issues 
of lands, resources, and fiscal arrangements on both a transitional and ongoing 
basis.11 These will also be the mechanisms through which Indigenous govern­
ments working collaboratively with other orders of government can evaluate the 
success of their eff orts. 
Similarly, guided by the legal and constitutional principles that are part of 
what is required by Section 35, recognition of rights, reconciliation, and the duty 
to act honourably, and in line with the commitments articulated in  the Principles 
respecting the Government of Canada’s Relationship with Indigenous Peoples , the 
federal government will need to strengthen its own capacity to respect and accom­
modate Indigenous nations’ core principles, constitutions and laws, agreements, 
and other tools; adjust its own bureaucratic administration; and be a willing and 
committed partner in the co-development of mechanisms that will eff ectively 
support the nation-to-nation relationship in both the immediate and long terms. 
WHAT DOES THIS MEAN FOR POLICY AND PROGRAM 
EVALUATION?
 The evaluation function is part of the apparatus through which non-Indigenous 
governments engage with Indigenous peoples. While there is a notable and de­
veloping history of Indigenous evaluation professionals who continue to en­
gage effectively with Indigenous communities, in general, relationships have 
suffered from the same structural impediments and pre-Section 35 biases that 
have slowed the country’s progress toward making the nation to nation vision 
overall. But that must change. The legal and constitutional framework developed 
by the courts since the introduction of s. 35 of the Constitution makes it clear that 
non-Indigenous governments must work as partners with Indigenous nations 
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based on recognition of Indigenous rights, reconciliation, and the Crown’s duty 
to act honourably in all of its dealings with Indigenous peoples. If the evaluation 
function is to remain truly effective in supporting both non-Indigenous and 
Indigenous governments in working together on the basis of these constitutional 
principles, evaluations professionals must find ways of reflecting those principles 
in their work as well. The question is, however, how the field can move forward to 
accomplish this. How will it change the approach to evaluation in practical terms? 
To begin, and at the broadest level, evaluation professionals may wish to 
consider three questions. First, in light of the Section 35 legal framework, how 
can evaluation models accommodate the fact of co-existing sovereignties? How 
will objectives be articulated, and responsibilities and accountabilities sorted out? 
Second, what is important to an Indigenous nation as a measure of success may 
be different from what is important to another order of government. Th e same 
may be true of what is considered “valid evidence,” including questions of what 
knowledge can and should be gathered, and how it should be gathered and com­
municated. What steps can be taken to ensure that evaluation models respectfully 
and substantively reflect Indigenous cultures, traditions, and laws? And fi nally, 
how can evaluation professionals develop a strategy that will help them do their 
jobs through what will, inevitably, be a long transition period as Indigenous na­
tions rebuild? How can these professionals prepare themselves to respond to the 
variety of forms that nation building will take and the varying timelines within 
which it will occur? 
Unfortunately, there are no clear, cookie-cutter or “off-the-shelf ” answers or 
evaluation models to off er. The nation-to-nation agenda is transformative and 
without precedent. It is about decolonization and making self-determination 
and self-government for Indigenous peoples real in the twenty-first century. It is 
“a project of disorder,” not mild adjustment (Cram, 2018), and it is—at its very 
core—a project of co-creation with non-Indigenous and Indigenous governments 
working together. It is thus inherently difficult, and it will take time. 
Evaluation professionals can prepare themselves to support the nation-to­
nation agenda by looking to the key legal principles flowing from Section 35 and 
the progressive view of those principles set out in the government’s  Principles 
respecting the Government of Canada’s Relationship with Indigenous Peoples to 
be both their guide and their “minimum standard”12 for evaluations. Th is will 
require a fundamental re-think of the purely accountability-focused purposes of 
governmental evaluations that extend from funding agreements. 
It begins by recognizing Indigenous rights, including the rights to self-
government and self-determination. This calls for a critical and profound shift in 
thinking and an acceptance that, in Canada, pre-existing Indigenous sovereignty 
and Canadian sovereignty must find ways of co-existing (Webber, 2017). Evalu­
ation professionals could then work toward building new relationships and new 
evaluation models that rest on that foundational reality. For example, advancing 
the principle of reconciliation would mean committing to deep collaboration that 
begins with understanding and sharing a commitment to Indigenous objectives 
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and continues through a willingness to share knowledge and co-build new frames 
and tools. Part of acting honourably would mean being transparent about govern­
ment’s expectations and interests and working with Indigenous nations toward 
a balanced approach that takes both Indigenous and non-Indigenous interests 
and values into account. It would mean ensuring that evaluation conceptual 
frameworks/inquiry paradigms are open to the Indigenous worldview, using In­
digenous ontological frameworks as guiding evaluation practices. And it would 
mean demonstrating commitment to realizing the vision of self-determination 
and self-government by working to strengthen Indigenous capacity. 
Taken cumulatively, this goes well beyond thinking about the “cultural re­
sponsiveness of methodology.” Just as Section 35 and the “nation-to-nation” 
agenda call for a complete reframing of the government’s historic colonialist 
relationship with Indigenous peoples (Webber, 2017), so also do they call for a 
complete reframing of the knowledge and methods used in evaluations (Bow­
man & Dodge-Francis, 2017). 
Bowman’s CRIE model (Culturally Responsive Indigenous Evaluation) off ers 
a picture of what the desired “blended” approach might look like. The model sets 
out the “Western” or non-Indigenous paradigm for what evaluations look like 
(strength, skills, and capacities; challenges and barriers; gaps and needs; solutions 
and strategies). It sets out an Indigenous paradigm (relations and community 
building; using your teachings; humility and balance; visioning and pathfi nding). 
And then it offers what could result by bringing the elements of the two paradigms 
together into a “blended” or balanced approach. The blended elements would be 
the following: building community through shared strengths and a strengths-
based approach; using challenges as opportunities to use teachings; addressing 
needs and gaps by humbly asking for help and restoring balance; and using 
experiential knowledge to develop evidence-based solutions for a future vision 
(Bowman & Dodge-Francis, 2017). 
 DEMONSTRATING LEADERSHIP
 The recognition of Indigenous communities as self-governing nations, enjoying 
sovereignty within the Canadian constitutional order, means that the nations 
will determine their own objectives and the means for achieving those objectives 
and will be accountable for achieving related results. That is the transformation 
that Indigenous communities want: decolonization, self-determination, and self-
government. Although they will continue to work with other orders of govern­
ment as partners, the instruments and mechanisms employed will necessarily be 
adjusted over time in order to accommodate the shared power that will character­
ize the ongoing reconciliation of Canada’s co-existing sovereignties. 
Bowman argues that “evaluation should be a tool of transformation, improve­
ment and empowerment” (Bowman & Dodge-Francis, 2017). But existing evalua­
tion tools have been externally imposed and do not reflect the worldviews, values, 
and goals of Indigenous peoples. Decolonizing the relationship with Indigenous 
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people will require decolonizing evaluation models and frameworks. It is about 
moving from evaluations that are framed and controlled by non-Indigenous 
governments to evaluations that are characterized by “collaboration, co-design 
and capacity building toward the central objective of ensuring that Indigenous 
evaluations are, ultimately, designed and led by Indigenous people” (Cram, 2018). 
 The journey will be challenging. Funding governments may at times be 
intransigent in their focus on their own accountability needs. But the larger con­
stitutional vision for the country is clear, the work is important, and evaluation 
professionals can welcome this moment of opportunity to support governments 
in advancing it. Taking that broader view, governments know they need the 
help. Guided by the legal and constitutional principles of recognition, reconcili­
ation, and the honour of the Crown, as well as by their own professional ethics, 
evaluation professionals can make an enormous contribution to rebuilding self-
determining and self-governing Indigenous nations so that those nations can 
reassume their rightful place in our constitutional order. Achieving that will 
ensure the survival, dignity, and well-being of Indigenous peoples in Canada 
(UN OHCHR, 2013). 
 NOTES 
1	 In Calder, the Supreme Court of Canada found that Aboriginal rights, and specifi cally 
Aboriginal title, existed in Canada before the  Royal Proclamation of 1763, were not 
derived from colonial law, and had not been extinguished by Crown sovereignty. Th e 
federal government had had a policy against negotiating land claims since the 1920s but 
aft er Calder it introduced the Comprehensive Claims Policy to deal with land claims. 
It also introduced the Specific Claims Policy to deal with disputes over land issues and 
treaty implementation. 
2	 Part 2 of the  Constitution Act, 1982, Schedule B to the  Canada Act, 1982 (UK), c.11. 
Section 35(2) of the Act defines “Aboriginal peoples” as including Inuit and Métis. 
3	 In Sparrow, making the point that the Crown controlled all the conditions within which 
Aboriginal rights and interests are judged, the Court noted that the Crown “established 
courts of law and then denied those courts the authority to question sovereign claims 
by the Crown.” 
4 	 The test for Aboriginal title is evidence that the land was exclusively occupied at the time 
of the Crown’s assertion of sovereignty ( Delgamuukw v. British Columbia , 1997 ). Th e 
test for Aboriginal rights apart from title is that the particular activity claimed as a right 
must relate to a practice, custom, or tradition that was integral to the Aboriginal group’s 
distinctive culture prior to contact with the Europeans ( R. v. Van der Peet , 1996 ). 
5	 It is also consistent with the approach taken in the  Charter of Rights, where individual 
rights may be subject to reasonable limits in a free and democratic society. See Sec­
tion 1. 
6 	 The duty to consult is also a procedural requirement in relation to treaty rights ( Mikisew 
Cree First Nation v. Canada (Minister of Heritage) , 2005 ). 
7	 RCAP meticulously made the legal and policy case for Indigenous rights to self-
government and provided extensive recommendations on how recognizing Indigenous 
nations as a third order of government could work. UNDRIP identifies the rights of 
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Indigenous peoples to develop and maintain their own political, economic, and social 
institutions, including juridical systems (Articles 5, 20 and 34), as among the “mini­
mum standards for the survival, dignity, and well being of the Indigenous peoples of the 
world” (Article 43). The TRC Report, informed by UNDRIP and adopting its human 
rights frame, effectively argued for self-government on the same basis and refl ected that 
in its 94 Calls to Action. 
8	 So far, the Supreme Court has not been faced with a situation that has required it to 
decide self-government rights, but it is difficult to disagree with those who argue that 
the Court has implicitly and at a general level recognized the existence of those rights 
based on its acknowledgement of pre-existing Indigenous societies, cultures, traditions, 
and laws that help determine the modern existence of other rights that are collective 
and include control over territory. In fact, the Court has even acknowledged “the pre­
existing Aboriginal sovereignty, along with Canadian sovereignty, and said that the 
Aboriginal rights and s. 35 are about the search between societies, each of which is en­
titled to be included in the Constitutional order” (Webber, 2017, p. 289). Nonetheless, 
the Court has demonstrated characteristic patience in the belief that these questions 
and other questions between the parties, both large and small, are best sorted out by 
the parties (governments) through principled negotiation. 
9 	 The SCC most recently underscored this view in its December 2017 decision in  Nacho 
Nyak Dun First Nation et al v. Government of the Yukon, [2017] 2 S.C.R. 576, commonly 
referred to as the “Peel Watershed” case. 
10	 One can argue that, although the process has been painfully slow and discontinuous, at 
some level, competing views of Indigenous self-government have been in “negotiation” 
since the mid-1990s. Preceding RCAP and the TRC, the Penner Report and Charlotte­
town Accord both supported the right to self-government for Indigenous peoples. And 
the federal government’s 1995 Inherent Right Policy, a companion piece to the Compre­
hensive Claims Policy, set out the parameters within which the federal government has 
been prepared to negotiate terms of self-government with Indigenous communities. 
11  The mechanisms should include dispute-resolution mechanisms that will support good 
relationships and reduce overall reliance on litigation. 
12	 A reference to the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
(UNDRIP) Article 43, which highlights the minimum standards required for the sur­
vival, dignity, and well-being of the Indigenous peoples of the world. 
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